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effort, and still fail to see how the possibility of thought necessitates the duty of thought. In short, our author seems to me to have been much more successful in the first half of his work in showing that duty implies truth, than he has been in the latter half in showing that truth implies duty. Clearness and vigor of style, and the close limitation of the discussion to the problems proposed, are admirable features of the work. There is not, however, a reference to a single philosophical writer from beginning to end.

F. C. FRENCH.

Inductive Logic. By JOHN GRIER HIBBEN, Assistant Professor of Logic in Princeton University. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896. — pp. xiii, 345.

This is one of the Logics which refuses to devote itself to solemn trifling over propositions and syllogisms dealing with the mortality of Socrates and the elemental nature of iron, but endeavors to give a philosophical theory of the procedure of thought in the face of the actual problems which the world presents to it. It is a distinct merit of the book that it begins by explaining the nature of Inference. If Logic is the science of thought, it is surely necessary to make clear, at the outset of any treatment of the subject, what is signified by thinking, — what results it aims at, and under what general conditions those aims can be realized. The doctrine which the author teaches in his first chapter would, I think, be accepted by every one at the present time, and his statement of it is simple and admirable. My own judgment is that even more space might profitably be devoted to making still clearer the structure of knowledge, and the nature of the thinking process. And it would be well, I think, to keep the general theory thus reached more explicitly in view throughout the work than Professor Hibben has done. That is, the theory should be applied to the various scientific methods described, so that they may be seen to be simply means for the fulfilment of the conditions previously laid down as necessary to the attainment of knowledge.

In the second chapter it is shown, as a direct result of the author's theory, that Induction and Deduction are not mutually exclusive processes, but necessarily go hand in hand. That teaching would, perhaps, have received additional emphasis, if the author had seen fit to treat of these two processes in the same work. There would then have been less danger of any one supposing that he had separated what God had joined together. The very term 'Inductive Logic' suggests that there is also a 'Deductive Logic,' dealing with a totally different kind of thinking. However, it is very ungracious to look a gift horse in the mouth. Let us be thankful for the treatment of Induction which Professor Hibben has given us.

There are three methods of inductive research laid down in chapter IV, — Enumeration, Comparison or Analogy, and Scientific Analysis or Search after Causal Connection. These designations cannot be regarded as happy. For, on the one hand, it is evident that Analogy is not the same thing as Comparison, and on the other, that it also implies a search after Causal Connection. It is a still more serious error in exposition, in my opinion, to invert the natural order, as the author has done, by beginning his treatment with the Method of Scientific Analysis. For Enumeration and Analogy are indispensable first steps towards the complete explanation at which that method aims. It therefore is essential to show the part which they play in that result. This can only be done by leading up through them to the Method of Scientific Analysis, by showing, in short, that the latter goes beyond them, while still including their results in itself. The author's method of arrangement unfortunately gives the impression that Enumeration and Analogy are independent, though imperfect, processes, which have nothing to do with the Method of Scientific Analysis, and that an account of them is merely appended to that of the latter.

An important feature of the work is the use of examples from the history of science as illustrative of the various methods of logical procedure. These illustrations are well chosen, and do much towards making the logical theories concrete and interesting. There is also a collection of examples at the end of the book intended to serve as exercises for the student. It is well to remember in this connection that the history of science is not only useful to the logician as furnishing him with illustrations of his theories. It is also to a large extent the source from which he learns the nature of the thinking process, — a mirror, as it were, in which our intelligence is reflected. It affords us a record of at least some of the more recent forms through which thought has passed, and a picture of some of its more notable failures and successes. The surest way of acquiring information regarding the nature of knowledge, says Whewell, is by surveying and studying the history of those sciences which are universally recognized as the surest examples of knowledge and of discovery (*Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, vol. I, p. 8). This is the reason, it seems to me, why the history of the sciences, like the history of philosophy, is of such immense educational value. Neither of these studies should be regarded as a mere record of opinions and events. For him who has eyes to see their real significance, they may become a biography of his own intellectual life, and an important influence in its development.

There can be no doubt that Professor Hibben has used the history of the sciences in his work as 'original material of investigation,' as well as for illustrative purposes.

J. E. C.